South Carolina: Admission of Cause & Origin Testimony by Fire Chief Was Prejudicial Error

In James D. Fowler v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 2014 WL 3844215, 2014 S.C. App. LEXIS 209 (S.C. App., Aug. 6, 2014), South Carolina’s Court of Appeals recently held that it was prejudicial error to allow the jury to consider either the report of a volunteer fire chief or his testimony on the issue of cause and origin if he does not qualify as an expert.  The take away is that if a firefighter can’t testify as an expert, any opinion he or she has on causation is simply not a datum that the fact-finder is entitled to know about.

shutterstock_208404577The insured’s home was destroyed by fire in January of 2007.  His homeowner’s carrier, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, denied liability after a fire investigator hired by the carrier determined that the blaze was incendiary, and the insured brought suit.  The fire was extinguished by the local volunteer fire department, after which its Chief, David Wright, completed a mandatory form known as a “Truck Report.”  This stated that the fire originated in a kerosene heater in the living room and that the “Cause of Ignition” was “unintentional.”

Prior to trial, Nationwide moved successfully to exclude any testimony by Chief Wright as to cause and origin.  At the trial itself, however, the circuit court judge both admitted the Truck Report into evidence and also allowed the fire chief to testify about his rationale in completing it.  Chief Wright stated that he determined that the living room heater was the point of origin because there was a V-shaped burn pattern on the living room wall and the heater was at the base of it.  With respect to the report’s statement that the blaze was “unintentional,” the fire chief testified that he “didn’t see or smell anything that made him think [the fire] was intentional.”  The jury returned a verdict in favor the policyholder in the amount of $504,444. Read more ›

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Posted in Arson, Arson and Fraud, Experts, Fire, Investigation

Vermont: There is No Cause of Action for Negligence in Adjusting a Property Loss

Last week, the Vermont Supreme Court firmly rejected the notion that an insured can bring a cognizable claim for negligence against his or her carrier in connection with the inspection and handling of a first-party property insurance claim.  In Helena G. Murphy v. Patriot Ins. Co., 2014 VT 96, 2014 WL 3965639, 2014 Vt. LEXIS 101 (Vt., Aug. 14, 2014), the court recognized that the relationship was “fundamentally contractual” in nature and that a policyholder’s rights flowed solely from the insurance policy and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in that instrument.

shutterstock_95374945In July of 2007, the insured, Helena Murphy, reported damage to the roof of her house and interior water damage to her homeowner’s carrier, Patriot Insurance Company.  The insurer promptly had the structure inspected by a claims adjuster, and it paid $3,553.05 for the loss.  The policyholder then proceeded to make a series of additional claims over the course of the next few months, and Patriot ultimately tendered over $30,000 to Ms. Murphy, including the full policy limit of $10,000 for damage from mold and rot.

The insured contended, however, that it would cost in excess of $56,000 to remediate the remaining mold and rot, and she brought suit for breach of contract in June of 2008.  An amended complaint was then filed adding, inter alia, claims against Patriot for negligence.  Ms. Murphy alleged that Patriot had an independent tort duty to handle her claim in a reasonable manner and had violated that duty by negligently inspecting and processing the claim, with the result that she suffered additional property damage and also health problems associated with the mold infestation. Read more ›

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Posted in Homeowners Coverage, Investigation, Loss Adjustment, Mold, Water

Florida Insurer Waives Two-Year Requirement by Waiting That Long to First Raise It

In Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Caribbean Beach Club Assn., 2014 WL 2900930 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App., June 27, 2014), a Florida court recently held that the insurer could not rely on a policy requirement that conditioned recovery of the cost of complying with current building codes during reconstruction on having completed the work within two years of the loss.  The insurer waived the two-year requirement by failing to raise it until the entire two years had elapsed and choosing to spend that time cooperating with the policyholder’s efforts to determine the necessary scope of repair instead.

shutterstock_44054The insured, Caribbean Beach Club Association, owned a time-share condominium building in Fort Myers that was heavily damaged by fire in April 2003.  It had property insurance coverage with Axis Surplus Insurance Company, and it had paid an additional premium for an Ordinance or Law Coverage Endorsement that provided up to $2.5 million for any increased cost of reconstruction incurred as a result of the enforcement of local ordinances or laws.  The endorsement recited that the insured could not recover, however, until after the property was actually repaired or replaced and that reconstruction had to take place within two years’ time.

The county building authorities had a “50% rule” mandating that if a building was more than 50% damaged, any reconstruction or repair had to comply with all current building codes.  In this case, the parties stipulated that that would add $1.8 million to the repair bill because it would require that the entire building be demolished and rebuilt at a higher elevation from the ground. Read more ›

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Posted in Fire, Ordinance or Law, Waiver

In Iowa, Rain is What Gene Kelly Sang In – Not Water From a Burst Drain Pipe

Earlier this year, an Iowa court recognized that rain becomes rainwater once it has fallen, and it held that policy language excluding loss caused by “rain” – without more – will not operate to bar coverage for water from a burst drain pipe that ruptured during a rainstorm.  The decision is reported at Amish Connection, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 847 N.W.2d 237, 2014 WL 1234161 (Iowa Ct. App., March 26, 2014).

shutterstock_170611241The insured, Amish Connection, Inc., leased space in a mall in Waterloo, Iowa, and its merchandise was damaged after a 4” cast iron drain pipe above the ceiling burst during a rainstorm.  The pipe carried water from the roof drains to a storm sewer.  The policyholder reported the loss on the day after the storm, and its commercial property insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, denied by letter on the same afternoon, stating that the loss was “caused by rain.”  The contract of insurance excluded loss “to the interior of any building or structure, or the property inside any building or structure, caused by rain, snow, sleet, ice, sand or dust, whether driven by wind or not[.]”  Rain itself was not a defined term.

Amish Connection brought suit.  The district court granted summary judgment to State Farm, ruling that the exclusion applied because the water that cascaded from the burst pipe was “rainwater.”  On appeal, a unanimous panel of the state’s intermediate level appellate court reversed, and they did so for exactly that reason – the loss was caused by rainwater and not the excluded peril of rain. Read more ›

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Posted in Flood, Water

Insurers Say “Over My Dead Body” to Claims for Damage From Decomposition

Last April saw decisions handed down in Pennsylvania and Florida that addressed the ghoulish question of whether first-party policies cover property damage from a decomposing body, and the courts in both jurisdictions held that the answer in no.  A word of warning – the balance of this post is not for the squeamish.

shutterstock_10128775The first decision was Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Creagh, — Fed.Appx. —, 2014 WL 1408868 (3rd Cir. , April 14, 2014).  The insured owned a building in Philadelphia where a tenant died in the bathroom of a second floor apartment.  The body went undiscovered for two weeks, by which time bodily fluids had seeped through the floor, contaminating both the apartment itself and parts of the first floor unit below, and there was “a powerful foul odor” in the entire structure.  The policyholder spent $180,000 to sanitize, remediate, and even rebuild portions of the building, and he then sought coverage from his property insurance carrier, Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London.

Lloyds denied, and the matter went into suit.  The Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to the insurer, and the Third Circuit affirmed earlier this year, holding that coverage was barred by two exclusions in the Lloyds policy.  The first was a “Microorganism Exclusion” that recited as follows: Read more ›

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Posted in Decomposition, Explosion, Microorganisms, Seepage or Leakage

Sixth Circuit Holds That Declines in Market Value are Not a Factor in Determining Actual Cash Value

In a case of first impression in Michigan, the federal Court of Appeals determined last month that general market conditions could not be considered when calculating actual cash value.  In Whitehouse Condominium Group, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., — Fed.Appx. —, 2014 WL 2743480 (6th Cir., June 17, 2014), the contract of insurance defined ACV as replacement cost less a number of factors including “obsolescence .”  The Sixth Circuit held that the word connoted only functional obsolescence as opposed to both functional and economic obsolescence.

shutterstock_179118050The policyholder owned a condominium building in Flint, Michigan that was heavily damaged by fire in November of 2010.  The policy afforded coverage for ACV, which was defined in the contract of insurance to mean “replacement cost less a deduction that reflects depreciation, age, condition and obsolescence.”  The insurance carrier, Cincinnati Insurance Company, determined that the value of the structure was $1,187,660.38, and it paid that amount to the insured.  The policyholder contended that the building was actually worth $1.6 million more, however, and it demanded appraisal.

The sole issue was the meaning of the word “obsolescence.”  The insured contended that it meant only functional obsolescence, which the Court of Appeals defined as “a loss in value due to something inherent in the building itself such as old technology (think an electric panel that is no longer acceptable under current codes) or bad design (think a five bedroom house that only has one bathroom).”  Cincinnati, on the other hand, argued that it meant both functional and economic obsolescence – “a reduction in value due to market factors entirely external to the building, such as neighborhood factors (this might occur if the neighborhood were suddenly under a noisy flight path) or the general market (the real estate market crash appears to be the factor in this case);”  The decline in property values in Flint was the reason for the difference between the two parties’ ACV numbers. Read more ›

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Posted in Actual Cash Value, Depreciation, Fire, Loss Adjustment

Argument That Rain Alone Can’t Cause a Flood “Would be News to Noah” Says a California Court

Last month an appellate court in California looked to the Bible, citing the Book of Genesis when rejecting the argument that an inundation caused solely by heavy rain was not an excluded flood.  The opinion was handed down in Horvath v. State Farm General Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2931049 (Cal.App., June 30, 2014).

shutterstock_25651162The insureds, Peter and Susan Horvath, owned a home at the end of a cul-de-sac at the bottom of Bell Canyon Drive.  On December 22, 2010, severe rainstorms led to what the husband described as a “river of water coming down the street.”  The town’s drainage systems were overwhelmed, and the cul-de-sac quickly filled up, ultimately inundating the first floor of the insureds’ home with 18” of water.  The couple were evacuated by firefighters, and the local municipality yellow-tagged the structure as unfit to live in.

The policyholders made claim under a homeowners policy issued by State Farm General Insurance Company.  The carrier denied liability because “flood” was an excluded peril under the contract of insurance.  Specifically, the language at issue recited as follows:

We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which is caused by . . . Water Damage, meaning flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, tsunami[.]

The term “flood” was not further defined in the policy. Read more ›

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Posted in Ambiguity, Flood, Water

New York Court: Storm Surge is a Species of Excluded Flood

One of the most litigated issues in the Gulf States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina was whether flood exclusions bar coverage for loss by storm surge.  The courts ultimately decided that the answer was yes.  The Superstorm Sandy jurisdictions have yet to address that question, but a recent federal case in New York suggests that the matter will ultimately be resolved in the same fashion in the Empire State.  The decision is New Sea Crest Healthcare Center, LLC, et al. v. Lexington Ins. Co., — F.Supp.2d —, 2014 WL 2879839 (E.D.N.Y., June 24, 2014).

shutterstock_126359603At present, the issue will not crop up nearly as frequently as it did in the wake of the 2005 storm because Katrina taught a lesson to underwriters everywhere; virtually all of today’s policies make it crystal clear that storm surge is a type of flood.  The policy at issue in this case is a good example, but the Eastern District nonetheless implied that it would have barred coverage even if that were not the case.

The policyholder owned a nursing home in Brooklyn, and it procured a property policy with Lexington Insurance Company.  The contract of insurance had a $1 million flood sublimit, and “flood” was defined as follows:

whether natural or manmade, Flood waters, surface water, waves, tide or tidal water, overflow or rupture of a dam, levy [sic], dike, or other surface containment structure, storm surge, the rising, overflowing or breaking of boundaries of natural or manmade bodies of water, or the spray from any of the foregoing, all whether driven by wind or not.

There was also a named storm provision with a sublimit of $36,650,000 for loss occasioned by the perils of “Flood, (however caused) wind, wind gusts, storm surges, tornadoes, cyclones, hail or rain.”  The named storm provision recited that damage by flood during a named storm was capped at the flood sublimit. Read more ›

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Posted in Ambiguity, Flood, Superstorm Sandy

New York Court: All Sandy Losses, Including “Downstream” Financial Ones, Capped By Annual Aggregate Limit For Flood

Superstorm Sandy jurisprudence is starting to shed light on some unresolved issues in the effected states.  In El-Ad 250 West LLC v. Zurich American Ins. Co., — N.Y.S.2d —, 2014 WL 2931058 (N.Y.Cty., June 27, 2014), a New York court held last week that a $5 million annual aggregate limit of liability for losses caused by flood capped any recovery for all such loss, without regard to whether it was physical damage to property or a “downstream” financial loss such as delay in completion.  It was a case of first impression in New York.

shutterstock_120132568On October 29, 2012, the policyholder, El-Ad 250 West LLC, was converting an 11-story office building into a 12-story luxury condominium complex in lower Manhattan.  Superstorm Sandy damaged the project to the tune of more than $20 million according to the insured.  El-Ad had a builder’s risk insurance policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Company.  The contract of insurance had a $115 million overall limit of liability, but delay in completion coverage was sub-limited to $7 million.  In addition, there was a $5 million annual aggregate limit for flood loss, which was defined as follows:

As respects the peril of FLOOD, OCCURRENCE shall mean all losses or damages arising during a continuous condition as defined in the definition of FLOOD.

El-Ad sustained both property damage and delay in completion losses, and it contended that the latter were subject to the contract of insurance’s $7 million sub-limit rather than the $5 million annual aggregate for flood.  Zurich disagreed, and the policyholder filed suit in state court in New York County in August of law year as a result. Read more ›

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Posted in Builders' Risk, Delay in Completion, Flood, Superstorm Sandy

Waiver of Attorney-Client and Work-Product – You Can’t Be Just a Little Bit Pregnant

A recent Mississippi opinion dramatically underscores the dangers of an advice-of-counsel defense.  In Willis v. Allstate Ins. Co., — F.Supp.2d —, 2014 WL 1882387 (S.D.Miss., May 12, 2014), the court held that the insurer had waived both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine with respect to coverage counsel’s entire file – and not just that portion of it that the carrier was willing to produce – when its representatives testified that they relied on the attorney’s advice to deny liability.  As the saying goes, in for a penny, in for a pound.

shutterstock_178587218The policyholder Sandra Willis’ home was damaged by a fire on June 14, 2012, and she made a claim under her homeowner’s policy with Allstate Insurance Company.  The insurer then hired an attorney, David Waldrop, to provide an opinion on coverage.  Waldrop did so in a letter dated February 19, 2013, and Allstate subsequently denied liability.  The insured responded by filing suit for breach of contract and bad faith.

During their 30(b)(6) depositions, the carrier’s  representatives testified that Allstate’s denial was based, in part, on Waldrop’s coverage opinion, and the carrier then provided the policyholder with a copy of the February 19 letter from counsel.   It withheld the balance of his file, however, and it scheduled the contents of that file on a privilege log.

The insured subsequently issued a subpoena requesting production of Waldrop’s “entire claim file of Sandra Willis, including any correspondence to and from Allstate and any reports to and from Allstate.”  Allstate moved to quash, citing the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine. Read more ›

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Posted in Fire, Privilege, U.S. Legal System, Waiver
About The Property Insurance Law Observer

For more than five decades, Cozen O’Connor has represented all types of property insurers in jurisdictions throughout the United States, and it is dedicated to keeping its clients abreast of developments that impact the insurance industry. The Property Insurance Law Observer will survey court decisions, enacted or proposed legislation, and regulatory activities from all 50 states. We will also include commentary on current issues and developing trends of interest to first-party insurers.

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