Seventh Circuit: Under Wisconsin Law, “Continuous or Repeated Exposure” Language Means That a Continuous Trigger Theory Applies

Yesterday, in Strauss v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., – F.3d – , 2014 WL 6435314, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21794 (7th Cir., Nov. 18, 2014), the Court of Appeals held that the use of the phrase “continuous or repeated exposure” in a Wisconsin first-party property policy’s definition of occurrence meant that the contract of insurance contemplated that the continuous trigger theory determined whether loss was covered.  As a result, a claim for 11 years of gradual water damage under a series of insurance policies was held to be timely even though it was first presented when the damage was initially discovered, five years after the last contract of insurance had expired.

shutterstock_124109527The Strausses had constructed a home in Mequon, Wisconsin in 1994, and they were insured by four separate Chubb carriers from then until October of 2005.  In October of 2010, Mr. and Mrs. Strauss discovered that a defect during construction in 1994 had been allowing water infiltration during every rainstorm over the past 16 years, causing damage to the building’s envelope.  They made claim under the 1994-2005 Chubb policies, but the insurers denied liability, and the Strausses brought suit in federal court in October of 2011, within one year of their discovery of the damage.

The policies covered “all risks of physical loss to [the] house” with coverage limited “only to occurrences that take place while this policy is in effect.”  The term “occurrence” was then defined as”

a loss or accident to which this insurance applies occurring during the policy period.  Continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions unless excluded is considered to be one occurrence.

Finally, there was a “Legal Action Against Us” clause mandating that any action against the insurers be brought “within one year after a loss occurs.” Read more ›

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Posted in Ambiguity, Homeowners Coverage, Trigger, Water

New Jersey Court Holds $22 Million “Named Storm” Deductible Applicable to a Superstorm Sandy Loss

On October 29th, a New Jersey trial court held that a commercial policyholder’s Superstorm Sandy claims were subject to a $22 million “named storm” deductible equal to 2% of the total insurable values at risk at all of the loss locations for which the insured made claim.  In Wakefern Food Corp., et al. v. Lexington Ins. Co., Case No. L-6483-13 (N.J.Super.Ct., Middlesex Cty., Oct. 29, 2014), the court held that damage had begun to occur hours before Sandy was downgraded and no longer constituted a “named storm” as defined and that that fact “created a substantial nexus between the storm and Wakefern’s total losses” justifying application of the deductible.

shutterstock_197340095Plaintiff Wakefern was a buying cooperative consisting of the owners of ShopRite and PriceRite supermarkets, and it had a commercial property policy issued by Lexington Insurance Company.  After Superstorm Sandy struck on October 29, 2012, Wakefern made claim for over $50 million in damage at dozens of different locations.

The contract of insurance afforded wind and hail coverage up to a $150 million sub-limit.  It also stated that the wind and hail coverage was subject to either a $250,000 per occurrence deductible or a deductible of “2% of Total Insurable Values at the time of the loss at each location involved in the loss or damage arising out of a Named Storm.”  The phrase “total insurable values” (TIV) was not defined, but the policy recited that a “named storm” was “a storm that has been declared by the National Weather Service to be a Hurricane, Typhoon, Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Storm or Tropical Depression.”  Read more ›

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Posted in Deductible, Hurricane, Superstorm Sandy

Second Circuit Affirms a Southern District Decision Construing “Covered Location” Narrowly

In January, the Southern District rejected an insured’s $2 million claim for a generator destroyed by Superstorm Sandy.  The unit was in the basement of an office building in lower Manhattan, but the contract of insurance defined “covered location” to mean the 33rd floor of the structure.  The district court rejected the policyholder’s argument that language insuring personal property “in buildings or structures at a ‘covered location’ “ extended coverage to the entire building including its basement.  On October 16th, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed this carrier-friendly interpretation in Jane Street Holding, LLC v. Aspen American Ins. Co., — Fed.Appx. –, 2014 WL 5287051, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19905 (2d. Cir., Oct. 16, 2014).

shutterstock_110443643Jane Street Holding, LLC was a trading company with offices in One New York Plaza in lower Manhattan.  On September 2, 2011, it purchased a commercial property policy from Aspen American Insurance Company for the 2011-2012 policy year.  Jane Street subsequently bought a $2.2 million generator and installed it in the basement of One New York Plaza.  The policy was renewed “as expiring” on September 2, 2012, and the generator was totally destroyed when Superstorm Sandy struck on October 29, 2012 and flooded Lower Manhattan.

The contract of insurance afforded $15 million in coverage for business personal property, $10 million in coverage for Electronic Data Processing Equipment, and $15 million in coverage for Equipment Breakdown,  and the generator was covered property as defined by all three coverage parts.  However, the governing policy language defined covered personal property as Jane Street’s “business personal property in buildings or structures at a ‘covered location’ or in the open (or in vehicles) on or within 1,000 feet of a ‘covered location.’ “  If the contract of insurance contained a Scheduled Locations Endorsement as Jane Street’s policy did, “covered location” was then defined to mean “a location that is described on the Location Schedule” of the endorsement.  In this case, the location schedule listed “One New York Plaza, 33rd Floor, New York, N.Y. 10004” as the “covered location.” Read more ›

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Posted in Flood, Insured Premises, Superstorm Sandy, Water

Oklahoma Supreme Court Reconciles Sewer Backup Exclusion With Accidental Discharge Coverage Grant

In May, we reported that a New York court had found that a policy containing both an exclusion for water that backs up through sewers and drains and a coverage grant for accidental discharge or overflow from a plumbing system was neither internally inconsistent nor ambiguous in nature.  The post can be found here.  On June 17th, Oklahoma’s highest court agreed, albeit without citing the New York case, and it held that the two provisions were fully reconcilable and enforceable.  The case in question is Porter v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 330 P.3rd 511, 2014 Okla. LEXIS 72 (Okla., June 17, 2014).

shutterstock_167733947Justin and Brandy Porter owned a home that was damaged when raw sewage entered the premises on November 14, 2009.  Their homeowners carrier was Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, and the insurer denied.  Litigation followed.  After the district court granted Oklahoma Farm Bureau’s motion to dismiss and the state’s intermediate level appellate panel affirmed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted the Porters’ writ of certiorari.

The contract of insurance afforded all risk coverage for real property loss but covered loss to personal property on a specified perils basis.  One of the specified perils enumerated was:

Accidental Discharge or Overflow of Water or Steam from within a plumbing, heating, air conditioning or automatic fire protection sprinkler system[.]

With respect to both real and personal property, the policy also excluded loss caused by “water damage meaning . . .  water which backs up through sewers or drains[.]” Read more ›

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Posted in Ambiguity, Flood, Seepage or Leakage, Water

Pennsylvania Court: Inaction When Damage is Known to Be Likely is Enough to Render the Loss Non-Fortuitous

On September 19th, a federal court in Pennsylvania held that a wall collapse was not fortuitous because the insureds knew that the wall was unstable and likely to fall and yet took no steps to correct the problem.  No one could say the loss was certain to happen, but the court effectively held that the insureds’ inaction was enough to make the collapse non-fortuitous given the likelihood that the wall would fail if it wasn’t repaired or braced.  The decision is Fry v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4662481, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131504 (E.D.Pa., Sept. 19, 2014).

shutterstock_73062277 The Frys owned a home in Fleetwood, Pennsylvania.  The house was a wood-frame structure with a stone veneer, and they noticed that the veneer was bulging in 2003.  An engineering report that they commissioned at the time attributed the problem to “an insufficient number of veneer wall ties and fasteners,” and the Frys paid $22,000 to have the exterior wall repaired.

As of 2011, the policyholders were insured by Phoenix Insurance Company, and the contract of insurance extended coverage to the peril of collapse, which was defined as “an abrupt falling down or caving in” of a portion of the structure.  In July of that year, the Frys made claim for bulging of the veneer’s exterior after a storm, and both the policyholders and Phoenix then secured expert reports.  The insured’s expert attributed the movement to the fact that “there is not a good connection between the stone veneer and the framed wall,” and he recommended repair and temporary bracing from outside if repairs could not be done “within the next couple months.”  The carrier’s expert ascribed the problem to “inadequate anchorage to the wood-framing” as well and also recommended repair and temporary bracing until that could be accomplished.  The insurer denied liability because the bulging was “not sudden and accidental” in nature. Read more ›

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Posted in Collapse, Fortuity, Water, Wear and Tear

Florida Court: Your Own Attorney is Simply Not a “Disinterested” Appraiser

As noted yesterday, last month saw an intermediate level appellate panel in Florida address whether the attorney for the policyholder could serve as that party’s appraiser.  It was a case of first impression in the Sunshine State.  In Florida Ins. Guar. Assn. v. Branco, 2014 WL 4648208, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 14602 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App., Sept. 19, 2014), the panel held that it was impermissible to select one’s own lawyer to act in that capacity when the contract of insurance called for a “disinterested” appraiser.

shutterstock_122066239The Brancos’ home was damaged by a sinkhole in April of 2010, and they made claim under a homeowner’s policy issued by Homewise Preferred Insurance Company.  The insurer denied liability, asserting that what had happened did not qualify as a “sinkhole loss” as defined, and the Brancos brought suit.  Homewise was subsequently declared insolvent, and Mr. and Mrs. Branco filed an amended complaint substituting the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association as defendant.

FIGA then conducted its own investigation, and it admitted in its answer that the sinkhole activity was a contributing cause of loss and that the Brancos were entitled to recover.  Mr. and Mrs. Branco demanded appraisal three weeks later and filed a motion to compel such a proceeding which was granted by the trial judge.  FIGA then took an appeal, making three arguments in opposition to the order to compel appraisal. Read more ›

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Posted in Arbitration and Appraisal, Loss Adjustment, Sinkhole

Florida Court Holds “Retained Rights” Provision Does Not Render an Appraisal Clause Unenforceable

In a pair of sinkhole cases, different panels of Florida’s intermediate level appellate court recently compelled appraisal, and the decisions are instructive because they address both challenges to the procedure and also the question of who is qualified to serve as an appraiser.  Today’s post will discuss Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Cannon Ranch Partners, Inc., – So.3rd –, 2014 WL 5286519, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 17033 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App., Oct. 17, 2014) where the panel rejected arguments that the appraisal clause was unenforceable because it permitted the carrier to deny the claim even after an appraisal had taken place.  Tomorrow’s post will then address who constitutes a “disinterested” appraiser.

shutterstock_126855290The case involved sinkhole damage to a piece of property owned by Cannon Ranch Partners, Inc.  The property was insured by Cincinnati Insurance Company, and the contract of insurance included coverage for sinkholes.  The dispute involved the necessary scope of repair.  Cincinnati’s two consultants determined that grouting was all that was needed to restore the structure to its pre-sinkhole state, but Cannon Ranch’s consultant opined that underpinning was also needed, and the policyholder entered into a contract to have that done.  Cincinnati refused to sign off on the work, however, and it made a demand for appraisal instead.

Cannon Ranch refused to participate, and it filed a breach of contract suit.  The insurer responded by moving to abate the litigation and to compel appraisal, but the district court denied the motion.  On appeal, a panel of Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal reversed, and it remanded for the entry of an order compelling the appraisal proceeding. Read more ›

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Posted in Arbitration and Appraisal, Loss Adjustment, Sinkhole

Iowa Decision Underscores the Danger of Sharing Privileged Material with Reinsurers

Last month, a federal court in Iowa handed down a decision holding that neither work product nor attorney-client nor the common interest doctrine shield legal advice and analysis from production in  discovery once it has been shared with a carrier’s reinsurers.  The case – Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. F.D.I.C., — F.R.D.— , 2014 WL 4168577, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116909 (W.D. Iowa, Aug. 22, 2014) – involved a directors & officers (“D&O”) liability policy rather than a first party property insurance policy, but it nonetheless sounds a cautionary note about the potential consequences of such disclosures.

shutterstock_216347893The case arose after the Office of Thrift Supervision closed Vantus Bank and appointed the FDIC as its receiver.  The FDIC then filed suit against the bank’s former officers and directors, alleging gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duties.  Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, which had issued a D&O policy to the bank, responded by filing a declaratory judgment action of its own, asserting that there was no coverage for the FDIC’s claims under its contract of insurance.

On March 10th, Magistrate Judge Leonard T. Strand ordered Progressive to produce copies of all communications with its reinsurers concerning either the D&O policy or the FDIC’s claims against the former officers and directors.  The insurer did so, but it redacted those portions containing legal advice and analysis, contending that these were shielded from disclosure by the work product doctrine, the attorney-client privilege, and/or the common interest doctrine. Read more ›

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Posted in Privilege, Reinsurance

Pennsylvania Court Addresses What Is a Coverage Dispute for Appraisal Purposes

Last month, a Pennsylvania federal court rejected the notion that a dispute over whether an admittedly covered occurrence necessitated repair of certain discrete portions of the damaged structure was a coverage dispute, characterizing it instead as merely a dispute over the extent of loss.  As a result, Currie v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2014 WL 4081051, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117970 (E.D.Pa., Aug. 19, 2014) held that the insurer could not refuse appraisal and stated that it was being “disingenuous” in arguing otherwise.

shutterstock_94635292The Curries were the owners of a home in Langhorne, Pennsylvania.  When Superstorm Sandy struck on October 29, 2012, the structure took a direct hit from a tree on the property.  The insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, conducted an inspection and then tendered its repair estimate to the policyholders together with a check for $56,940.54 – the actual cash value of the estimate less the policy’s deductible.  The Curries responded by submitting their own repair estimate in the amount of $363,804.98.  State Farm then conducted a new inspection and made a supplemental payment of $9,502.09.

The insureds asserted that State Farm’s payments were insufficient, and they made a written demand for appraisal.  The carrier rejected that, stating:

This claim involves certain items for which State Farm has not admitted liability.  These items include, but are not necessarily limited to, sanding and refinishing of the wood floors.  Since the dispute goes beyond the amount of loss, appraisal is not an appropriate method of resolution.

A lawsuit for both breach of contract and bad faith followed.  State Farm moved for summary judgment on the extra-contractual count, arguing that the Curries had failed to produce evidence that it had acted in bad faith in denying their request for appraisal “when there was a clear coverage dispute.” Read more ›

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Posted in Arbitration and Appraisal, Bad Faith, Homeowners Coverage, Loss Adjustment, Superstorm Sandy

Fourth Circuit: Twenty-Seven Days of Inaction Enough to Waive Right to Rescind for Violations of Protective Safeguards Clause

The marriage liturgy in the Anglican Book of Common Prayer contains the well-known line “speak now or forever hold your peace,” and the take-away from a recent Fourth Circuit decision out of North Carolina is clearly “act now or forever lose your rights.”  In Colony Ins. Co. v. Peterson, — Fed.Appx. —, 2014 WL 4179962, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16320 (4th Cir., Aug. 25, 2014), a divided panel of the Court of Appeals held that an insurer had to pay a $2.5 million fire loss even though the policyholders had made material misrepresentations in their application and violated a protective safeguards endorsement.  The carrier was deemed to have waived its right to rescind and to be estopped from denying coverage because it had not acted on an inspection report revealing the violations that was received only twenty-seven days before the blaze.

shutterstock_148029368Effective March 16, 2010, Colony Insurance Company issued a commercial property policy providing $4.5 million in coverage for a vacant, 95,000 sq. ft. building in Montezuma, Georgia.  In light of the vacancy, the insurer insisted that the policy include a protective safeguards endorsement requiring that the policyholders maintain an automatic sprinkler system, fire extinguishers, and functioning utilities and reciting that Colony would “not pay for loss or damage caused or resulting from fire if, prior to the fire, [the insureds] [f]ailed to maintain any protective safeguard . . . in complete working order.”  The policyholders’ application for coverage also recited that the utilities in the building were on.  When the insurer had the structure inspected in early April, however, the utilities were all found to be shut off.

Colony received the inspection report on April 21st, but its underwriter did not review it until June 18th.  In the interim, the insurer issued both a mortgagee endorsement (April 22nd) and a loss payee endorsement (May 6th).  The building was then severely damaged by fire on May 18th.  After the blaze, firefighters discovered that the valves controlling the sprinkler system had been turned off and “tampered with and vandalized.” Read more ›

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Posted in Arson, Arson and Fraud, Fire, Inspection, Protective Safeguards, Rescission, Waiver
About The Property Insurance Law Observer

For more than five decades, Cozen O’Connor has represented all types of property insurers in jurisdictions throughout the United States, and it is dedicated to keeping its clients abreast of developments that impact the insurance industry. The Property Insurance Law Observer will survey court decisions, enacted or proposed legislation, and regulatory activities from all 50 states. We will also include commentary on current issues and developing trends of interest to first-party insurers.

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