Last Friday, a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit held that loss from the excluded peril of mudslide occurring one month after a wildfire could be covered as the “direct” result of the blaze. In Stankova v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 3429395, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8935 (9th Cir., May 29, 2015), it reached that result even though Arizona has not adopted the efficient proximate cause rule, saying that it did not need to apply that doctrine to determine that the mudslide “could have been directly and proximately caused by the wildfire.” It also blithely ignored anti-concurrent causation (ACC) language, which is given effect in Arizona, as “inconsistent with Arizona’s standard fire insurance policy, which insures against all direct loss by fire.”
The policyholders owned a home with a detached garage in Alpine, Arizona. Beginning on May 29, 2011, eastern parts of the state and western New Mexico were devastated by a massive blaze known as the Wallow Fire – we published a post about an Arizona district court decision concerning business interruption loss that stemmed from that conflagration last month. The fire consumed the detached garage and all of the vegetation on the nearby hillside, but it did not reach the house. On August 6, 2011, however, one month after the Wallow Fire had been contained, there was a mudslide on the hillside, and mud and runoff water from flooding destroyed the home.
The insureds made claim under their homeowners policy. The carrier paid for the loss to the garage, but it denied the claim for the house because the contract of insurance expressly excluded loss attributable to:
Water damage, meaning any loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by . . . flood [or] surface water flooding; and
Earth Movement, meaning any loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by events that include, but are not limited to . . . mudslide
These exclusions were prefaced by ACC language reciting that the carrier did not cover loss “which would not have happened in the absence” of the excluded event “regardless of . . . the cause of the excluded event; . . . other causes of the loss; or . . . whether such causes acted at the same time or in any other sequence with the excluded event to produce or contribute to the loss.” Read more ›
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