Florida, Georgia and Texas Appraisal Update: Is Causation A Coverage Question For The Court or A Damages Question for The Panel?

In most jurisdictions, underlying coverage issues must be resolved prior to invoking appraisal in a first-party property claim.  The question of what constitutes a coverage issue (typically reserved for a court’s judicial determination) and what constitutes a damage issue (appropriate for an appraisal panel’s consideration), however, is not always readily apparent. A routine subject of this particular appraisal debate is whether causation is a coverage or a damages inquiry, and recent decisions under Florida, Georgia and Texas law are evident of two things: (1) the determination of the issue is, in large part, factually dependent; but (2) the debate is far from over.

In a recent appellate decision, Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Denetrescu, 2014 WL 1225124, — So.3d — (Fla. 4th DCA, March 26, 2014), Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal found that causation is a coverage question and only for the court’s consideration when the underlying facts include a complete coverage denial by the insurer. There, the insurer issued such a denial for wind and rain damage to a roof and the resulting contents damage based on policy exclusions for wear and tear, neglect, and pre-existing damage, as well as on the policyholder’s non-compliance with post-loss duties under the contract of insurance. The policyholder filed a lawsuit challenging the insurer’s denial and filed a motion to compel appraisal during the course of discovery. In the lower court’s order granting the policyholder’s motion, the court included the its coverage determination – namely that “water leaks are covered under the policy” and that the insurer’s “affirmative defenses dealing with specific exclusions under the policy are appropriate for appraisal as the defenses deal with the causation of the damages.”

shutterstock_95689426On appeal, the District Court of Appeal completely rejected the lower court’s use of an order compelling an appraisal as a vehicle to make coverage determinations, finding that it was procedurally improper and violated due process. The court was clear that, under Florida law, such coverage determinations are only appropriate when based on competent evidence reviewed through either summary adjudication or at trial. Additionally, and in light of the insurer’s complete denial of the damage at issue, the District Court of Appeal held that a judicial determination on all coverage issues, including causation, must first be made by the court.  In reaching its ruling, the court cited a Florida Supreme Court decision, Johnson v. National Mut. Ins. Co., 828 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 2002), which held that “causation is a coverage question for the court when an insurer wholly denies that there is a covered loss and an amount-of-loss question for the appraisal panel when an insurer admits that there is covered loss, the amount of which is disputed.”

In Texas, the United States District Court for the Southern District also addressed whether causation could fall within the permissible scope of appraisal under in its January 30, 2014 decision in United Neurology, P.A. v. Hartford Lloyd’s Ins. Co., 2014 WL 345666, — F. Supp.2d — (S.D. Tex. January 30, 2014) concluding that causation was within the appraisal panel’s authority where a partial denial of coverage was at issue. The United Neurology case arose from a policyholder’s claim for a complete roofing system replacement and payment for interior damage and loss of income associated with two rental properties following Hurricane Ike. Due to the insurer’s finding that a substantial portion of the damage was not caused by the hurricane – but rather from expressly excluded causes of loss, including pre-existing wear and tear and post-loss neglect – the insurer issued a partial denial and invoked the appraisal clause. Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with: , ,
Posted in Arbitration and Appraisal, Causation, Preservation and Protection, Wear and Tear

Tenth Circuit Holds That Two-and-One-Half Years and Two-and-One-Half Million Dollars Do Not Constitute Prejudice

In BSC Holding, Inc. et al. v. Lexington Ins. Co., — Fed.Appx. –, 2014 WL 929194 (10th Cir., March 11, 2014), the Tenth Circuit recently underscored  how difficult it can be for an insurer to demonstrate prejudice as a result of late notice.  The District of Kansas had granted summary judgment to Lexington, but the Court of Appeals reversed and sent the matter back to the lower court, holding that “substantial prejudice” had not been shown despite the fact that the policyholder had waited two-and-one-half years to notify the carrier and had spent $2.5 million dollars before doing so.

Lyons Salt Company owned a salt mine in Kansas.  In January 2008, mine workers detected an inflow of water into the mine, and the insured set out to determine the cause and to devise a solution.  In April 2010, following an extensive investigation by geotechnical experts and engineers, the inflow was attributed to an improperly sealed oil well that was deforming overlying shale formations.  The experts told Lyons that the situation was “dire”  and that a quick remedy was required, and the insured immediately set about constructing a specially-designed concrete bulkhead to seal off part of the mine.

shutterstock_95321077Lyons notified Lexington of the water inflow in July 2010, after it had already spent $2.5 million on the problem.  The insured sought coverage under six Lexington policies of “all risk” property insurance issued between March 2004 and April 2010.  Suit was filed in the Spring of 2011 after Lexington refused to commit to reimbursement.  The sworn statement in proof of loss that Lyons submitted in December of 2010 sought $7.5 million, and the policyholder was estimating that the total cost of investigating and fixing the intrusion would top $11 million as of last year.

In the trial court, Lexington argued that it had suffered prejudice, and the District of Kansas agreed, granting the insurer’s motion for summary judgment.  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit assumed “that [Lyons] waited too long to notify Lexington,” but Judge Robert E. Bacharach nonetheless reversed, holding that Lexington had failed to show substantial prejudice.

Under Kansas law, an insurer can show prejudice by “presenting evidence that (1) its ability to investigate the claim has been lost; or (2) opportunities to negotiate settlement have been lost; or (3) opportunities to defend have been lost.”  According to the Court of Appeals, “to demonstrate prejudice, the insurer must show that it would have handled some aspect of the investigation, discovery or defense differently, and that with this change, [the insurer] could have either defeated the underlying claims or settled the underlying claims for a lower sum than for what the insureds settled.” Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with:
Posted in Investigation, Notice, Water

Social Media — The Possibilities Are Endless!

Facebook.  Instagram.  YouTube.  Twitter.  LinkedIn.  SnapChat.  Flickr.  Google+.  Tumblr.   WeChat.  MySpace.  WhatsApp.  Reddit.  The list of social media and networking sites goes on and on.  It’s fairly common knowledge these days that a defendant can use social media and networking sites such as those  to investigate personal injury claimants.  In addition, more and more companies are using these types of sources to research potential employees.  You may be surprised to learn, however, that social media can be an extremely useful tool for the investigation of property damage and business interruption losses.shutterstock_134112389

Consider some scenarios:

An insured submits a claim for damage to a roof, asserting that it was the result  of a recent storm.  However, using the “Historical Imagery” capability of Google Earth (which allows you to see images from years ago), you learn that the damage to the roof pre-dated the storm.

An insured’s home is completely destroyed by fire, and the policyholder submits a list of contents.  Photographs taken inside the insured’s home during the holidays and at parties (taken or posted by either the insured herself or by her friends and family) prove that the actual contents of the residence are considerably  different than what she has alleged (e.g., there was a 47” flatscreen, not an 80” one).

An insured businessowner submits a claim for business interruption after his store is destroyed in an earthquake.  However, by tracking the insured’s Twitter, Google +, and Facebook statuses, posts and comments, you learn that the insured started selling his products  on-line shortly after the quake and has been steadily making half the amount of money he made with over-the-counter sales before the structure was leveled. Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with:
Posted in Investigation

A New York Court Bars Coverage for a Power Outage Caused by Superstorm Sandy

This week saw a New York court bar a policyholder’s claim for business interruption occasioned by the loss of off-site power after Superstorm Sandy.  In Johnson Gallagher Magliery, LLC v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1041831 (S.D.N.Y., March 18, 2014), the federal court held that a law firm could not recover for the six-day period during which one of Consolidated Edison’s networks was out-of-service.  The network was shut down preemptively several hours before the storm, and the contract of insurance’s “acts or decisions” exclusion was held to bar coverage for that period of time.  In addition, a “water” exclusion operated to preclude coverage for the time necessary to clean, repair, and re-energize the system after the flooding where “the only relevant evidence in the record” established that the sole cause of the damage was the excluded peril of water.

The policyholder was a Manhattan law firm with offices in a building on Wall Street.  The structure received electric power from Con Edison’s Bowling Green Network, which was a network that the utility had identified as susceptible to catastrophic failure should its equipment come into contact with salt water.  As Sandy approached on October 29, 2012, Con Edison preemptively shut down that network.

shutterstock_117450418Sandy struck several hours later, causing extensive flooding in lower Manhattan.  The Bowling Green Network suffered “extensive water damage” from the flooding, and Con Edison spent the next several days pumping out the water and cleaning, testing, and – as necessary – replacing its equipment.  The network was re-energized early in the morning on November 3.

The policyholder’s building did not receive electricity again until November 11, however, and the law firm was unable to return to its space until November 16.  In addition, telephone and internet service was not restored until January 7, 2013.

The policyholder had a business interruption insurance policy issued by Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company, and it made claim for business income lost during this two month period.  Charter Oak denied, and the firm brought suit in state court in New York.  After removal to the Southern District, Charter Oak filed a narrowly-focused motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to bar coverage for the power interruption between October 29 and November 11 on the basis of two exclusions. Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with:
Posted in Acts or Decisions, Business Interuption, Direct Physical Loss or Damage, Flood, Superstorm Sandy

The House and Senate Vote to Roll Back National Flood Insurance Program Premium Increases

Congress has officially placed the bipartisan Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act in hands of President Obama.  If enacted, it will undo significant provisions of a 2012 law that caused sharp flood insurance rate increases.

On March 4, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 306-91 to pass the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, H.R. 3370.  This repeals portions of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act.  Just yesterday, March 16, the U.S. Senate voted 72-22 to approve the bill and send it to the President for his consideration.

For those who don’t remember the Biggert-Waters Act, it was passed back in 2012 with overwhelming support in both houses of Congress.  It called for changes to the National Flood Insurance Program.  The NFIP, as you may know, is currently running an enormous and ultimately unsupportable deficit of $24 billion, so the Biggert-Waters Act aimed to eliminate subsidies for two kinds of homes: those homes built before flood maps existed and those homes “grandfathered” in, which is to say that they were originally built to code only to find that the new FEMA maps placed them in high-risk flood zones.  In doing so, Biggert-Waters caused steep rate increases for owners of these types of properties.  Homeowners in Florida, for example, saw annual flood insurance rate increases from $2,000 to $10,000 under the Biggert-Waters Act.

shutterstock_150004427In January, the Senate passed a bill which called for a four-year delay of the rate increases imposed by the Biggert-Waters.  House leaders, however, wanted a more permanent fix, and they also wanted to avoid adding to the insolvency of the NFIP.  Thus, the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act was born.  The bill proposes, among other things: (1) to roll back certain rate increase “triggers” so that policyholders will no longer face rate increases as a result of the sale of a home or a lapse in coverage;  (2) to provide a refund for those who already got hit under the foregoing  provisions;  (3) to restore “grandfathering” so that homes and businesses that were previously built to code and later remapped into a higher risk area by FEMA won’t face rate increases due to the remapping; and  (4) to impose a cap on FEMA’s ability to raise annual insurance premium rates.  Under the bill, FEMA can still increase premiums for owners of homes built before the flood insurance rate maps, but the increases have a hard cap of 18 percent per year (down from 20 percent under Biggert-Waters), and will typically range from only 5 percent to 15 percent.

President Obama is expected to sign the bill into law when it reaches his desk.

About The Author
Tagged with:
Posted in Flood, Flood Insurance

The Fourth Circuit Clarifies Who Is A Direct Supplier Under Contingent Business Interruption Coverage

In Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. et al., — F.3d. — , 2014 WL 642993 (4th Cir., Feb. 20, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently clarified who constitutes a direct supplier of goods and services under contingent business interruption (CBI) insurance, and it specifically rejected arguments that the undefined term “direct” in the coverage grants of the CBI endorsements at issue was ambiguous in nature.

shutterstock_173639594The policyholder, Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, Ltd., processed titanium dioxide at its facility in Western Australia, using natural gas that it received via a pipeline.  It purchased the gas from Alinta Sales Pty Ltd., a retail gas supplier.  Alinta, in turn, purchased the gas it supplied to Millennium from others, including Apache Corporation.

Apache extracted and processed natural gas and then injected it into the pipeline, where it comingled with gas from other producers.  As soon as the substance was injected, custody, title, and risk for it passed to Alinta, and Apache had neither any ownership interest in the pipeline nor any contractual relationship with Millennium.

In 2008, an explosion shut down Apache’s facility, and the Australian government subsequently imposed controls, giving priority for delivery of the substance to essential services.  The result was that Millennium was forced to shut down for a number of months.

Millennium had CBI coverage with National Union Fire Insurance Company and ACE American Insurance Company.  The CBI endorsements in the two contracts of insurance provided Millennium with $10 million in coverage for “any unnamed direct contributing properties,” and they recited that only a “direct supplier of materials to the Insured’s locations” could be a “contributing property.” Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with:
Posted in Ambiguity, Business Interuption, Contingent Business Interruption, Explosion

Federal Courts In New York and New Jersey Explore Streamlining Superstorm Sandy Discovery

Despite opposition by both many attorneys and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), the federal court for the Eastern District of New York has now taken the first steps towards grouping some of the hundreds of pending Superstorm Sandy cases and expediting discovery in all of the them, and the District of New Jersey appears very likely to follow suit.

Superstorm Sandy is now officially the second most costly storm in United States history, having caused over $50 billion in damages, and one of the most heavily-impacted jurisdictions was the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.  The Eastern District comprises Staten Island and all of Long Island, including the New York City boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens.  As of early February, over 800 Sandy cases were pending there against insurance carriers.  By contrast, less than half-a-dozen were in litigation in New York’s neighboring Southern District, which consists of Manhattan, the Bronx, the lower Hudson River valley.

shutterstock_158369090Faced with what she described as “an onslaught” of lawsuits, the district’s Chief Judge Carol Bagley Amon ordered the clerk to open a miscellaneous civil case captioned “In Re: Hurricane Sandy Cases,” Docket No. 14 MC 41, on January 10 “for the purposes of Pretrial Case Administration in all actions seeking insurance coverage for damage caused by Hurricane Sandy.”  She simultaneously directed three magistrate judges “to evaluate and make a recommendation regarding how to best handle all Hurricane Sandy cases.”

On January 14, the magistrates ordered counsel in all Superstorm Sandy matters that had been filed in the district’s two courthouses (Brooklyn and Central Islip) to submit schedules of their cases, identifying the parties, the properties, the judges assigned, and the “type of policy—wind damage, flood damage or both.”  The attorneys were also required to submit letters by January 24 setting forth their proposals with respect to how the court could logically group the matters for discovery and settlement purposes.  Finally, the panel scheduled a February conference to discuss counsel’s suggestions. Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with: ,
Posted in Catastrophes, Superstorm Sandy, U.S. Legal System

New York’s Highest Court Holds a Two-Year Suit Limitation Provision Can Be Unenforceable

In answer to a question certified by the Second Circuit, New York Court of Appeals has held that a two-year suit limitation provision in a property insurance policy – which the court acknowledged was not an “inherently unreasonable” provision – was unenforceable under the factual circumstances of the case before it.  Executive Plaza, LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., — N.Y.3d –, 2014 WL 551251, 2014 N.Y. LEXIS 165 (N.Y. Feb. 13, 2014).  In doing so, the court held for the first time that such a limitation period may be rendered unreasonable by what it called an inappropriate accrual date.

shutterstock_94679761Peerless Insurance Company issued a $1 million fire insurance policy to Executive Plaza.  This gave Executive the choice to select payment of “actual cash value” or payment of  “replacement cost.”  The policy also provided that Peerless would not pay the replacement cost for any loss or damage until the property had actually been repaired or replaced.  Finally, the policy contained a suit limitation clause that required the insured to commence any legal action within two years from the date of loss.

On February 23, 2007, Executive’s office building in Island Park, New York was severely damaged in a fire.  Peerless paid the actual cash value of the destroyed building, and Executive then notified the insurer that it would be making a replacement cost claim for the balance of the $1 million policy limit.  Peerless responded that Executive could only do so after providing “documentation verifying the completion of repairs.” Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with:
Posted in Replacement Cost, Suit Limitation

Florida Property Manager’s Insurable Interest Is Limited To Its Fees

In Banta Properties, Inc. v. Arch Specialty, Ins. Co., —Fed.  Appx.— , 2014 WL 274478 (11th Cir., January 24, 2014), the Eleventh Circuit recently  held that a property manager’s insurable interest in the apartment complexes that it managed was limited to the income that it was entitled to receive under its contracts with the buildings’ owners.  Under Florida statutes, the measure of insurable interest is the loss that the policyholder might sustain from damage to the property, and that was held to preclude the property manager from asserting such an interest and recovering on its own behalf for the property damage that the apartments sustained from Hurricane Wilma.

shutterstock_111643277In October of 2005, Hurricane Wilma damaged three apartment complexes in Broward County, Florida.  The property manager for all three was Banta Properties, Inc., a company owned by various Banta family members.  The individual family members also owned two of the three properties at the time of the storm, having sold the third one (Parkcrest Apartments) to an unrelated, non-party entity two months beforehand.

Banta Properties was the named insured under a primary, $2.5 million commercial property policy from General Star Insurance Company.  The defendant, Arch Specialty, provided $8.5 million in excess property coverage, and both carriers’ contracts of insurance listed the three complexes as additional named insureds. Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with:
Posted in Additional Insureds, Hurricane, Insurable Interest

Wisconsin Adds “Septage” To The List Of Substances Deemed To Be Pollutants

In Preisler v. Kuettel’s Septic Service, LLC, et al., 2014 WL 114325 (Wisc.App., Jan. 14, 2014), the intermediate level of appellate court in Wisconsin recently held that “septage” – a combination of water, urine, feces, and chemicals that is used as a fertilizer – was “unambiguously a pollutant.”  The case involved the scope of comprehensive general liability (“CGL”) coverage, but the CGL policy exclusions at issue were virtually identical to pollution exclusions commonly found in first-party contracts of insurance.  The decision is important to property carriers as a result, and it also rejects a number of arguments that first-party insureds frequently make in an effort to limit or avoid the application of such language.

shutterstock_102263728The Preislers owned a dairy farm with cattle, and they used a well to stock a pool on the property.  For several years, they had defendant Kuettel’s Septic spray several thousand gallons of septage on their farmland.  Kuettel’s Septic was in the business of removing, hauling, storing and disposing of the substance, which comes from septic tanks, grease traps, floor pits, and car washes.  It is disposed of by either taking it to a treatment facility or by spreading it on farmland as a fertilizer.  It contains high levels of nitrogen.

In 2008, a large algae bloom appeared in the Preislers’ pool and their cattle began to die.  Tests subsequently showed that the septage had caused an elevated nitrate level in the well water.  The Preislers drilled a new well and then brought suit against Kuettel’s Septic and its CGL carriers, alleging private nuisance, trespass and strict liability and tort.  The insurers asserted that pollution exclusions in their policies barred coverage, and both the Circuit Court and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals agreed.

The contracts of insurance all excluded damage caused by the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants.  In addition, they all defined the term “pollutant” to mean any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalines, chemicals and waste.  The appellate court had no difficulty in concluding that septage was “a contaminant, an irritant, and a waste substance” and, therefore, fell within the ambit of the exclusionary language. Read more ›

About The Author
Tagged with: ,
Posted in Efficient Proximate Cause, Exclusions, Pollution, Reasonable Expectations
About The Property Insurance Law Observer

For more than five decades, Cozen O’Connor has represented all types of property insurers in jurisdictions throughout the United States, and it is dedicated to keeping its clients abreast of developments that impact the insurance industry. The Property Insurance Law Observer will survey court decisions, enacted or proposed legislation, and regulatory activities from all 50 states. We will also include commentary on current issues and developing trends of interest to first-party insurers.

Subscribe For Updates

propertyinsurancelawobserver

Archives
Topics
Cozen O’Connor Blogs