In J & D Towing, LLC v. American Alternative Insurance Corporation, No. 14-0574, 2016 WL 91201 (Tex. Jan. 8, 2016), the Texas Supreme Court considered J & D Towing, LLC’s (“J & D”) claim for loss of use damages under its underinsured motorist insurance policy, after J & D’s only towing vehicle was totally destroyed in an accident. After discussing decades of Texas case law limiting loss of use damages to cases involving partial destruction, the Court held that the owner of totally destroyed personal property may recover loss of use damages, in addition to the property’s fair market value immediately before the injury. The Court’s holding reverses over 60 years of prior case law prohibiting recovery of loss of use damages in total destruction cases, and brings Texas in line with the majority of jurisdictions.
J & D is a vehicle towing company located in Huntsville, Texas. On December 29, 2011, an accident with a third party rendered J & D’s only truck a total loss. J & D claimed the value of the truck exceeded $19,000, and also sought its loss of use damages based on its inability to conduct business. Although the third party’s insurer offered to pay the truck’s value, the third party insurer refused to pay for any loss of use damages. After nearly two months, J & D settled its claim for the third party’s policy limits of $25,000. Read more ›
Courts in a number of American states, notably California, have found that pollution exclusions in first-party policies are “inherently ambiguous” and that the purpose of such provisions is “to address liability arising from traditional environmental pollution, and not ‘ordinary acts of negligence involving harmful substances.’ ” On December 11th, the Vermont Supreme Court unanimously refused to follow that line of jurisprudence in 
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The insureds owned a home in Lake in the Hills. On August 5, 2014, a fire rendered the dwelling uninhabitable, and the policyholders’ 19-year-old son, who resided with his parents, subsequently admitted to setting the blaze. The boy was sentenced to prison for the crime of aggravated arson. The carrier denied the insurance claim of the husband and wife in reliance on an intentional loss exclusion reciting that the policy did not cover “any loss arising out of any intentional or criminal act committed . . . by you or at your direction . . . with the intent to cause a loss.” The terms “you” and “your” were defined by the contract of insurance as meaning “the person or persons named in the Declarations and if a resident of the same household . . . the relatives of either[.]” 
The insured owned a home in Madison that suffered water damage from a malfunctioning dishwasher, and he brought suit against the carrier and its independent adjuster, alleging that they had underpaid the loss. The allegations included negligence; the policyholder contended, inter alia, that the adjuster had prepared a negligent estimate and neglected to include damage to the homeowner’s personal property in his scope of loss. The adjuster moved to dismiss the negligence count, and Judge Victor Bolden granted the motion on November 24th. 
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The first case was 